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On Credit Spread Slopes and Predicting Bank Risk 
 
By C. N. V. Krishnan, Peter H. Ritchken and James B. Thomson 
 
We examine whether credit-spread curves, engendered by a mandatory subordinated-debt requirement for 
banks, would help predict bank risk.  We extract the credit-spread curves each quarter for each bank in 
our sample, and analyze the information content of credit-spread slopes.  We find that credit-spread 
slopes are significant predictors of future credit spreads. However, credit-spread slopes do not provide 
significant additional information on future bank-risk variables, over and above other bank-specific and 
market-wide information. 
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Economists have extensively analyzed the information content of the term structure of riskless
interest rates. In contrast, very few studies have investigated the information content of credit-
spread slopes. At any point in time the shapes of credit-spread curves for diﬀerent ﬁrms can
be diﬀerent. Some ﬁrms may have upward-sloping credit-spread curves while other ﬁrms may
have downward-sloping curves. Over time, credit-spread slopes can move in similar or diﬀerent
directions. Our objective, in this paper, is to understand why credit-spread curves diﬀer across
ﬁrms, how they move over time, and what information they convey about future ﬁrm risk.
We ﬁrst examine whether credit-spread slopes convey information on future credit spreads. Of
course, the ability to predict future credit spreads does not necessarily imply that credit-spread
curves have the ability to predict future ﬁrm-risk variables. Therefore, we also examine whether
credit-spread slopes convey information on future ﬁrm-speciﬁc accounting-risk variables.
Our study focuses on banking ﬁrms because policymakers are actively considering the use
of subordinated debt (SND) as a regulatory tool. They believe that the resulting credit-spread
curves could be informative of bank risk. A consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (1999) (Basel II) proposes new risk-based capital standards with a
view to increased granularity in risk measurement and improved supervision. Mandatory SND
requirement appears to be the cornerstone of Basel II’s proposals. The U.S Shadow Regulatory
Committee has also come out strongly in favor of mandatory SND as a mechanism for realizing
enhanced market discipline of banks. Moreover, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 requires
all large banking ﬁrms to have at least one SND issue outstanding at all times. If credit-spread
slopes that would be spawned by a mandatory SND requirement contain information about
future bank risk, then monitoring credit-spread slopes will be an eﬀective way of monitoring
bank risk.
Numerous studies have been undertaken to establish whether the rational expectations the-
ory of the riskless term structure holds. The tests have examined whether the slope of the yield
curve is capable of predicting future changes in the short rate. Shiller, Campbell and Schoen-
holtz (1983) conclude that the simple version of the theory, which says the slope of the term
structure could be used to forecast the direction of future changes in the interest rate, is “worth-
less.” However, later studies by Fama (1984), Mishkin (1988), and Hardouvelis (1988), among
others, have found predictability at the very short end of the term-structure curve. Fama and
Bliss (1987) ﬁnd that long rates had useful information for predicting short-rate movements.1
In contrast, very few studies have been conducted at the ﬁrm level to establish whether
1For excellent reviews of this literature, see Rudebusch (1995), and Backus, Foresi, Muzumdar and Wu (2001).
1credit-spread slopes carry useful information for predicting future ﬁrm risk. There are several
possible reasons for this. Unlike the Treasury market, extracting the term structure of credit
spreads for individual ﬁrms is delicate. In order to do it, the ﬁrm has to have several issues
of publicly traded debt with maturities that span the term structure. Further, the debt must
be frequently traded, and prices must be publicly available. Finally, because of the limited
availability of traded bonds for each ﬁrm, exchanging maturities to alter yields is more diﬃcult
in the corporate bonds market than in the Treasury bond market.
Theoretical option models, starting with Merton (1974), have shown that credit-spread
curves could be increasing, decreasing, or hump-shaped. Low-quality ﬁrms have downward-
sloping credit spreads reﬂecting the fact that over the longer term they would have to improve
in order to survive. In contrast, high-quality ﬁrms may deteriorate over the long run and, hence,
their longer-dated credit spreads should widen with maturity. Extensions to the Merton model
by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995) and Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), among others, have
basically drawn similar conclusions. The empirical evidence, however, has been somewhat mixed.
Fons (1994) and Sarig and Warga (1989) have provided support for this theory, while Helwege
and Turner (1999) ﬁnd that speculative-grade issuers have positively sloped credit spreads.
Implicit in the explanations for the slope of credit-spread curves is the assumption that
the term structure of credit spreads compensates investors for bearing default risk. However,
recent studies have shown that default risk may account for a small component of credit spreads.
Huang and Huang (2002) use structural models of bond prices to examine credit spreads and
conclude that credit risk only accounts for around 20%−30% of the observed spreads. Similarly,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) conclude that the majority of changes in credit
spreads arise from factors that are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc or related to equity-market performance or
interest rates. Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2003) conclude that the primary drivers of
changes in credit-spread levels for banks are common market variables. They ﬁnd that changes
in ﬁrm-risk variables account for a small fraction of the variability in changes in credit spreads.2
As a result, the term structure of credit spreads and changes in credit spreads may reﬂect
events other than default and recovery assessments. It is therefore unclear what ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information is contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve in general, and the credit-spread
slope in particular.
Our paper is most closely related to Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2003), who extract
2Other factors have also been found to aﬀect credit spreads. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) estimate
a state tax premium of the order of 40 basis points. Perraudin and Taylor (2003), and Houweling, Mentink and
Vorst (2003) use diﬀerent methods to estimate a liquidity premium of the order of 20 basis points. Yu (2002)
investigates a transparency premium.
2credit-spread curves for banking ﬁrms to determine whether ﬁrm risk changes get reﬂected in
credit spread changes. Our study uses the same database of debt transaction prices and the same
credit-spread-extraction process as theirs. However, rather than focus on the contemporaneous
determinants of credit-spread changes, our goal here is to investigate whether the credit-spread
slopes of banks contain information on future credit spreads and, more importantly, on future
bank-risk variables.
We ﬁnd that the credit-spread curves of banks can be upward or downward sloping, but the
average credit-spread slope is negative. Credit spreads of lower-quality ﬁrms are typically higher,
and their slopes more steeply downward sloping. Moreover, there is signiﬁcant information con-
tained in the credit-spread curve about future credit spreads. Our ﬁndings on the predictability
of future credit spreads based on current credit-spread slopes are in line with the results on the
predictability of riskless-rate changes obtained by Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar and Wu (2001).
The degree of predictability of future credit spreads depends on the maturity of the spread. We
ﬁnd that longer-dated credit spreads are more predictable, and not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and market-wide factors. However, shorter-dated credit spreads are inﬂuenced by
ﬁrm-risk variables and market variables. In particular, ﬁrm ratings, Treasury yields, market
returns and market volatility inﬂuence shorter-dated future credit spreads.
These ﬁndings lead us to suspect that perhaps credit-spread slopes carry information about
future bank-risk variables. We ascertain whether credit-spread slopes have predictive power
with respect to future bank-risk variables, over and above other known information about a
bank such as its current period balance-sheet information and credit rating. We do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence that credit-spread slopes can predict future bank-risk variables. We also
examine whether this ﬁnding is speciﬁc to banks or is more general. We use a control sample
of non-banking ﬁrms and get the same result: current period credit-spread slope cannot predict
future ﬁrm-risk variables.
Hence, we conclude that credit-spread curves engendered by a mandatory SND requirement
for banks are unlikely to provide signiﬁcant additional information to investors and regulators
on future bank-risk, over and above the information they would already possess in the absence
of any SND.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 describes the model used to construct the credit-spread curves for each ﬁrm each quarter,
and discusses the ﬁt. Section 4 examines the features of credit-spread slopes. Sections 5 and
6 examine the predictability of future credit spreads and future ﬁrm-risk variables respectively
using current-period credit-spread slopes. Section 7 concludes.
32D a t a
2.1 Risky-Bond Transaction Data
Our ﬁrst task is to construct credit-spread curves at the end of each quarter for as many diﬀerent
banks as possible, and then to repeat this exercise for a control sample of non-banking ﬁrms. The
reason we use quarters as our time increment is that we want to relate changes in credit spreads
to changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, and such information is available only over quarterly
intervals.
The data for our analysis comes from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) on cor-
porate bond characteristics and the National Association of Security Commissioners (NAIC)
database on bond transactions. Data from both databases are matched for the period January
1994 through December 1999. The FISD database contains issue and issuer-speciﬁc information
for all U.S. corporate bonds maturing in 1990 or later. The NAIC database consists of all trans-
actions in 1994-1999 by life insurance, property and casualty insurance, and health maintenance
companies.3
We separate all data into two broad categories of banking ﬁrms and non-banking ﬁrms.4 For
banking ﬁrms, we have 18,776 trades across 185 diﬀerent ﬁrms. The distribution of trades and
banking ﬁrms across the 24 consecutive quarters is shown in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.
For non-banking ﬁrms, we have 240,876 trades involving 3,265 diﬀerent ﬁrms. The ﬁrst two
columns of Table 2 show the breakdown of trades for non-banks for the successive quarters.
Our ﬁrst screen eliminates all bonds other than ﬁxed-rate U.S. dollar-denominated bonds
that are non-callable, non-puttable, non-convertible, not part of an unit (e.g., sold with warrants)
and have no sinking fund. We also exclude bonds with asset-backed and credit-enhancement
features. This ensures that our credit spreads relate more directly to the creditworthiness of the
issuer rather than the collateral. We use only transaction prices. Further, we eliminate all data
that have inconsistent or suspicious issue/dates/maturity/coupon etc., or otherwise do not look
reasonable.
Tables 1 and 2 Here
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of trades by quarter that remain
3This database replaces the no longer available Warga (1998) database that was used by Blume, Lim and
Mackinlay (1998), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Elton, Gruber, Agarwal and Mann (2000,
2001) and is the one used by Campbell and Taksler (2002).
4We use the term banking ﬁrms to refer generically to both banks and bank holding companies.
4after applying this ﬁlter for banks and non-banks. For banking ﬁrms, we are left with 14,660
trades over 144 diﬀerent banking ﬁrms. For non-banks, we are left with 26,808 transactions from
245 ﬁrms. Our second screen eliminates all ﬁrm-quarter combinations for which we have fewer
than 7 trades for the quarter. This ﬁlter ensures that we obtain a reliable credit-spread curve
for a ﬁrm at the end of each quarter. For banking ﬁrms, this leaves us with 9,167 transactions
over 81 diﬀerent banking ﬁrms, while for non-banking ﬁrms, we are left with 16,480 transactions
from 210 diﬀerent ﬁrms. Columns 5 and 6 of Tables 1 and 2 show the resulting distribution of
transactions using this criterion. Our third and ﬁnal screen removes ﬁrms for which we cannot
collect ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk variables. We need data to compute all our ﬁrm-risk measures for all
the 24 quarters of our data set plus one quarter before our data begins and one quarter after it
ends (the actual risk measures we use are discussed later). For banks, that leaves us with our
ﬁnal database of 6,590 transactions from 50 ﬁrms. For non-banks, we have 9,703 transactions
from 133 ﬁrms. The distributions of the trades and ﬁrms over each quarter are shown in the
ﬁnal two columns of Tables 1 and 2.
We are, ﬁnally, left with a database that contains the transaction prices, trading dates, and
the speciﬁc terms of SNDs, ordered by ﬁrm-quarters. Table 3 provides details on maturity and
coupon of SNDs as well as ﬁrm ratings of our ﬁnal sample of banking and non-banking ﬁrms.
Table 3 Here
Table 3 shows that the descriptive statistics of bonds issued by our sample of non-banking
ﬁrms are roughly similar to those issued by our sample of banking ﬁrms. We use these ﬁnal
samples of banking and non-banking ﬁrms to construct the credit-spread curves for each ﬁrm
each quarter. The average number of issues (transactions) per ﬁrm-quarter used to construct
credit-spread curves for banking ﬁrms was 5.01 (13.67). Almost 60% of all banking issues (and
about 70% of all non-banking issues) in our ﬁnal sample have time to maturity between 1 and
10 years. Based on these results, in some of our analyses, we focus on the 3 year credit spreads,
a n do nt h e1 0− 3 year credit-spread slopes.
2.2 Riskless Yield Data
We need to estimate the zero riskless yield curve for each day. To set this up, for each day
we use the weekly 3-month, 6-month, one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, ten, twenty and thirty year
constant-maturity-treasury rate data from January 1993 to December 2000 obtained from the
web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use a cubic-smoothing-spline procedure
to extract the par rates for 3 and 6-month maturities, and then for all remaining maturities at 6
5month intervals. From this par curve, we then extract the zero-coupon rates for 3− and 6-month
maturities and for all maturities thereafter at intervals of 6 months. The ﬁnal saved output for
each day is the annualized continuously compounded zero coupon yields for the three and six
month rates, and for the one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, ten, twenty and thirty year maturities.
In addition to the risky and riskless yield data, we use the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk data
and economy-wide data in our analyses.
2.3 Firm-Speciﬁc Risk Variables
We use the following 5 proxies for risk for banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in our
analysis: (a) Return on Assets (ROA), computed as Net Income Before Taxes and Extraordinary
Items divided by Total Assets; (b) Loans to Total Assets, computed as Loan Assets divided by
Total Assets; (c) Non Performing Assets computed as (Loans past due 30-89 days + Loans
90 days past due + Non accrual loans) divided by loans and leases net of unearned income;
(d) Net charge-oﬀs, computed as (Charge-oﬀs minus recoveries) divided by loan assets; and (e)
Leverage, computed as Total Assets divided by Total Equity Capital. As ROA increases, bank
risk decreases, while as each of the other 4 ratios increases, bank risk increases. All the bank
risk ratios are calculated from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s Reports
of Income and Condition (henceforth Call Reports), while all BHC variables are calculated from
the Federal Reserve Y-9 statements.
We use the following 5 risk variables for non-banking ﬁrms: (a) Return on Assets (ROA),
computed as Net Income Before Taxes and Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets; (b)
Interest Cover, Operating Income Before Depreciation divided by Interest expense; (c) Proﬁt
Margin, computed as Operating Income Before Depreciation divided by Sales; (d) Market-to-
Book Ratio, computed as (Number of shares outstanding times Closing share price) divided by
Stockholder Equity; and (e) Leverage, computed as (Total Assets minus Stockholder Equity)
divided by Stockholder Equity. As ROA, Interest Cover, Proﬁt Margin, or Market-to-Book
Ratio increases, ﬁrm risk decreases, while as leverage increases, ﬁrm risk increases. All the ﬁrm
risk ratios are calculated from the quarterly data ﬁles of Compustat.
In addition, we use credit-rating information on issues made by each banking and non-
banking ﬁrm. The credit ratings come from Duﬀ and Phelp, Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s,
and Fitch. We establish a single numeric credit score for each ﬁrm-quarter. First, we translate
the letter ratings from each agency for each issue on each ﬁrm into numeric scores, with 1
representing the lowest rating and 15 the highest rating. We then take the average values of
all the agency ratings over all outstanding issues each ﬁrm-quarter, to obtain a single numeric
6credit-rating score for each ﬁrm each quarter. The most common ratings for the banking ﬁrms
in our sample, using the Standard & Poor’s notation, are BBB+, A− and A, which correspond
to scores of 9, 10 and 11 respectively.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of subordinated debt maturities issued by our ﬁnal sample of
banking ﬁrms for which we have issue ratings. Consistent with the premise behind the paper




We use 5 market variables in our analyses. These are (a) the Growth in Industrial Production
(GIP), (b) S&P 500 buy and hold return (S&P), (c) 5-year Treasury yield (T5), (d) the slope
of the yield curve deﬁned as the 10-year Treasury yield minus 3-year Treasury yield (TSlope)
and (e) a stock market volatility index - the VIX Index. The data on GIP, T5 and TSlope are
taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the S&P data comes from the
Center for Research in Securities Prices database, and the data on VIX index comes from the
Chicago Board Options Exchange website.
3 Extracting Credit Spreads
Our goal is to use the price information on all bonds for each ﬁrm that traded in a particular
quarter together with concurrent riskless term structure, to extract a term structure of credit
spreads for each ﬁrm at the end of each quarter. Given the abundant daily information on the
riskless term structure, we use a 2-factor model to estimate the parameters with the help of
the Kalman ﬁltering technique. Given the limited trade data for a ﬁrm-quarter, the dynamics
for credit spreads are kept relatively simple. Our model requires only that the short credit-
spread process for each ﬁrm be mean reverting, correlated with interest rates, and have constant
volatility over each quarter. Since the parameters are reestimated each quarter, and at each
traded date take the riskless term structure as given, the model’s primary purpose is to provide
a very close ﬁt to the observed credit spreads.
73.1 Pricing Risky Bonds
We adopt a reduced form model, in which the default process is modeled directly as surprise
stopping times. Let h(t) be the hazard rate process, with h(t)dt representing the risk neutral
probability of defaulting in the interval (t,t + dt). We follow Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) and
deﬁne recovery, yr(τ), at the time of default, τ, to be a fraction, φ, say, of the pre-default value
of the bond. That is:
yr(τ)=φG(τ ,T)
where G(t,T) is the price of the zero coupon bond that promises to pay $1 at date T.D u ﬃ e
and Singleton consolidate the hazard rate with the loss rate and deﬁne the instantaneous credit
spread, s(t), to be:
s(t)=h(t)(1 − φ(t)).
They show that the price of a risky zero coupon bond can be obtained by pretending the bond





















where P(t,T) is the date-t price of a riskless bond that pays $1 at date T.W ed e ﬁ n et h ed a t e - t










In order to establish a model for the credit-spread curve at any date, sp(t;·), then, requires
the speciﬁcation of the dynamics for the interest rate process, r(t) and the instantaneous spread,
s(t).
The full dynamics of the state variables under the data generating measure is then given by:
dr(t)=[ θ(t)+u(t) − ar(t)]dt + σrdwr(t)( 3 )
du(t)=−bu(t)dt + σudwu(t)( 4 )
ds(t)=[ α0 − α1s(t)]dt + σsdws(t)( 5 )
where EP
t [dwr(t)dwu(t)] = ρurdt, EP
t [dwu(t)dws(t)] = ρusdt, EP
t [dwr(t)dws(t)] = ρrsdt, a =
a + λrσr,a n dα1 = α1 + λsσs.
8Here, the interest rate evolves according to a two-factor double mean-reverting model. The
value of θ(t) is chosen to make the model consistent with the prices of all zero coupon bond prices.
u(t) is a component of the long-run average mean of the short rate. It is stochastic and mean
reverts to zero at rate b. The parameters a, b, σr,a n dσu, are constants and dwr(t)a n ddwu(t)
are standard Wiener processes, with correlation ρrudt. The market price of interest rate risk,
λr(t), is proportional to r(t), and the market price of central tendency risk, λu(t), is zero. This
latter assumption is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Jegadeesh and Pennacchi (1996).
Finally, we assume that the credit spread process has constant volatility, σs, mean reverts, and
its innovations are correlated with the innovations of the interest rate process. The market price
of credit-spread risk, λs(t), is assumed to be proportional to s(t).





















































Our state variables (rt,u t,s t) are not directly observable. However, we do have a rich set of
riskless term-structure data that allows us to measure, with error, functions of (rt,u t).
To facilitate estimation using discretely observed data, we separate the estimation problem
into two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, we estimate the riskless term-structure parameters using
a time series of cross-sectional riskless bond prices. We impose both cross-sectional model
restrictions and conditional time series restrictions. We accomplish this using the Kalman ﬁlter
approach, which is a recursive, unbiased least squares estimator of a Gaussian random signal.
While, in principle, the Kalman ﬁlter approach could be used for the entire system of riskless
and risky bonds, the availability of data on risky-bond trade prices data is comparatively smaller.
Therefore, the resulting credit spread parameter estimates each quarter would depend too heavily
on the initial priors that need to be speciﬁed. To avoid this possible bias, we adopt an empirical
Bayes estimation procedure used in non-linear mixed eﬀects models. This approach produces
consistent estimators and is very close in intent to the Kalman ﬁltering approach.
3.2.1 Estimating Parameters from Riskless Prices
To facilitate estimation using discretely observed data, we rewrite the riskless bond model as
a discrete time state space system. Notice that in order to do this we need to specify the
dynamics of the state variables under the data-generating measure. This requires speciﬁcation
of the market prices of risk. Under this process, the joint distribution of the riskless interest
rate state variables {r(t),u(t)} is bivariate normal when viewed from any earlier date. With
discretely observed data, we can write:
St+h = γ0(h)+γ1(h)St +  t+h (8)
where S 
t =( r(t),u(t)), γ0(h)  =( θ
































































Equation (8) deﬁnes the state transition equation. If at date-t, we observe the prices of bonds
with maturities m1, m2,m3,...,mn, then the n yields can be written in matrix form as
Yt = G + HSt +Υ t (9)
where
Y  
t =( yt(m1),y t(m2),...,y t(mn))
G  =( A(m1),A(m2),...,A(mn))
H  =

B(m1) B(m2) ... B(mn)
C(m1) C(m2) ... C(mn)

and the measurement error in the yields is Υt ∼ (0,σ2
ΥIn).
Equations (8) and (9) constitute a state space system whose parameters can be estimated
by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is estimated recursively using a Kalman ﬁlter
as follows.
We ﬁrst need an estimate of the initial state vector, S0, and its variance-covariance matrix,
R0, say. More generally, assume at date t, St and Rt are given. Viewed from date t,o u r
predictions for date t + h are:
ˆ St+h|t = γ0(h)+γ1(h)St
ˆ Rt+h|t = γ1(h)Rtγ1(h)  + Q(h)
The innovation vector, ηt+h, and its variance, Vt+h, are computed as:
ηt+h = Yt+h − (G + H ˆ St+h|t)
Vt+h = σ2
ΥIn + H ˆ Rt+h|tH 
11The date-t forecasts are then blended with the date t + h innovations, to yield the updated
values for St+h and its variance Vt+h as follows.
St+h = ˆ St+h|t + ˆ Rt+h|tH V −1
t+hηt+h
Rt+h = ˆ Rt+h|t − ˆ Rt+h|tH V −1
t+hH ˆ Rt+h|t
After computing the innovation vector ηt,a n dVt for each date using this recursive procedure,











The optimal parameter set corresponds to the set that maximizes this function. This optimiza-
tion procedure is solved using numerical methods.
3.2.2 Estimation of the Credit-Spread Parameters
Consider a particular ﬁrm and assume that over a quarter there are K observable bond trades.
Let t1 <t 2 <...<t K represent the trade dates, and let ai represent the actual bond price at
date ti, i =1 ,2,...,K. Notice that the ﬁrm may have multiple bonds outstanding so that the
coupons and maturity dates at diﬀerent trade dates might vary. Let ˆ ai be our theoretical risky
bond price computed at date ti, conditional on knowledge of the state variables at date ti.T h e
parameters that remain to be estimated are Φ = {α0,α 1,λ s,ρ rs,ρ us,σ s}.
Let S represent the path of the state variable over the K trading dates. That is, S =
{s(t1),s(t2),...,s(tK)}. Further let:
ˆ A  =( ˆ a1,ˆ a2,..., ˆ aK)
A  =( a1,a 2,...,a K).
Let SSE(Φ,s(0),S) represent the sum of squared errors between bond price residuals given the
initial spread, s(0), the path, S, and the parameters in Φ. Our goal will be to choose estimates
that minimize the expected sum of squared errors, where the expectation is taken over all possible
paths. Notice that the residuals will be correlated because the time series of state variables is
generated by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Let ΣK be the K × K covariance matrix with








12where tij = Max[ti,t j]a n dtij = Max[ti,t j]. Consistent least squares estimates are then
generated by minimizing the following expected weighted sums of squares.
Mins0,ΦE[(A − ˆ A) Σ−1
K (A − ˆ A)]
3.3 Empirical Results
Figure 2 shows the basis point errors when our model is used to determine the riskless yield
curve. The ﬁgure shows histogram plots for all the one-step-ahead prediction errors, by maturity.
Figure 2 Here
On average, the model displays almost no bias in estimating yields, and the majority of
predictions fall within 20 basis points of the observed values. The average absolute one week
prediction yield errors is 10.44 basis points.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution of errors in bond prices produced by our
model, for banking ﬁrms. The percentage errors are bucketed by the underlying maturity of
the bond, and the results are presented in the form of histograms. The ﬁve maturity buckets
correspond to: shorter than 2 years, 2−5y e a r s ,5−10 years, 10−20 years, and greater than 20
years. All transactions are included in the analysis. In particular we had over 1000 transactions
in each of the ﬁve classes, with the modal class being the 5 − 10 year group, which contained
over 5000 transactions. The histograms reveals that the inter-quartile ranges for percentage
errors for banking ﬁrms are symmetrically distributed about zero for all maturity contracts.
The inter-quartile range extends for about 2.5%. In aggregate, the mean (median) pricing error
was 0.22% (0.16%). The mean of the absolute percentage errors was 2.2%, while the median of
the absolute percentage errors was 1.2%. These results indicate that the model is ﬁtting actual
data remarkably well with no obvious biases along the maturity spectrum.
Figure 3 Here
We compare the distribution of pricing errors for banks to the pricing errors for non-banks.
The right panel of Figure 3 shows the histograms of pricing errors for our sample of non-banks.
The results are fairly similar to those of banks. The average percentage pricing error per banking
ﬁrm is close to zero, and there are very few observations where the average deviates from 0.5%.
This indicates that the estimation of credit-spread curves for banking ﬁrms has indeed eﬀectively
incorporated the information on bond prices.
134 Credit-Spread Slopes
We examine the properties of the credit spreads that we have extracted for each bank each
quarter. The ﬁrst two panels of Table 4 summarize the average credit spread levels and the
average credit-spread slopes for the full sample of banking ﬁrms as well as for sub-samples
segregated by credit ratings, type, size and leverage. The high credit rating category comprises
banking ﬁrms with credit ratings of A− and above. High and low categories based on size
(total assets) and leverage are deﬁned in terms of being above and below the sample median
respectively.
Table 4 Here
Banks have higher credit spreads than BHCs, perhaps because the holders of subordinated
debt issued by BHCs typically have recourse to assets owned by other banks and non-bank
subsidiaries in the same holding company. Smaller banking ﬁrms have larger credit spreads
than the larger ones, but the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. Higher leverage banking ﬁrms have
slightly greater credit spreads than the less levered banking ﬁrms, but again, the diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. The biggest diﬀerences are in the credit rating categories. The
lower rated banking ﬁrms have higher average credit spreads for all maturities. The gap in credit
spreads between the low and high ratings groups is typically around 30 basis points for most
maturities, reaching a maximum of over 40 basis points for the 5 year maturity.
While the riskless term structure over this period was generally upward sloping, the average
credit-spread slope for banking ﬁrms is negative. The average 3 − 1 year credit spread slopes
is −24 basis points, and the average 10 − 3 year credit spread slopes almost −18 basis points.
Like the average credit spreads, credit-spread slopes for the two credit-ratings groups are also
quite distinct. For the lower rated banking ﬁrms, the average credit spread curve is more than
twice as steeply negative. The average 10 − 3 year slope, for example, is −38 basis points. In
contrast, for the higher rated ﬁrms, the slope is −14 basis points. These results are consistent
with the ﬁndings of Fons (1994), who claims that low rated ﬁrms would be more likely to display
downward sloping credit spread curves.
All the credit-spread slopes are highly correlated. The correlation between the 10 − 3a n d
the 3−1 slopes is 90%; between the 10−3a n dt h e7−3s l o p e si s9 9 .3%; and between the 10−3
and the 10 − 5 slopes is 99%.
We next investigate how the credit-spread slopes depend on the type of banking ﬁrms.
We categorize all credit-spread curves into 4 groups, with the ﬁrst group comprising the most
14negative sloped credit spread curves (slope less than -30 basis points). The second group consists
of the remaining negative (and ﬂatter) credit-spread slopes; the third group comprises slightly
positive slopes of upto 2 basis points; and the fourth group consists of the remaining (steeper)
positive credit spread curves. The proportions of all credit-spread curves in each group are
indicated in the table and are roughly equal. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the proportion
of credit-spread curves in each of these groups. For the lower rated banking ﬁrms, almost 40%
of the curves are in group 1 (steeply negative), while only 17% are in group 4. The proﬁles
of slopes for the sub-samples that are based on ﬁrm type, size, and leverage are all close to
the proﬁle of the full sample. Clearly, credit-spread slopes of the lower-rated banking ﬁrms are
diﬀerent from those of the higher-rated banking ﬁrms.
4.1 Time-Series Properties of Credit-Spread Slopes
The top panel in Figure 4 shows the time series patterns of bank credit-spread slopes. Slopes can
be positive or negative and the patterns in signs for each ﬁrm appear to be stable over time. The
second panel in Figure 4 shows the changes in credit-spread slopes over time. In each quarter,
we test the null hypothesis that the proportion of increases in slope equals the proportion of
decreases. Over the 24 quarters, the null hypothesis was never rejected. On average, the slope
changes are negative for 48% and positive for 52% of the banking ﬁrms each quarter. When
we examine the high and low rated banking ﬁrms separately, slope change patterns are almost
identical: on average, for the low rated banking ﬁrms, slope changes are negative for 49% of
the banks and positive 51% of the banks each quarter, and for the high rated banking ﬁrms,
slope changes are negative for 48% of the banks and positive 52% of the banks each quarter.
Since there is no systematic pattern over time, it appears that common market factors are not
a driving force for determining slopes.
Figure 4 Here
The scatter diagram in the third plot of Figure 4 shows the relationship between future
(next-period) changes in credit-spread slopes as a function of current slopes. A pattern of mean
reversion can be seen. When the slope of the credit-spread curve is very steep, positive or
negative, then there is an increased likelihood that in the next quarter the slope will ﬂatten.
154.2 Future changes in Credit-Spread Slopes
The left panel of Table 5 reports the distribution of future credit-spread changes conditional on
current credit-spread slopes. As before, we set up 4 groups for future credit spread changes as
well as future slope changes, again with group 1 representing the most negative change group
and group 4 the most positive change group.
Table 5 Here
If there were no relationship between current credit-spread slopes and future credit spreads,
then for each row, the proportion of observations in each cell would be 25%. However, we ﬁnd
that, for all ﬁrms, when the credit spread curve is very steeply negative, the likelihood of a large
negative change in the 3-year credit spread is 44%. When the current slopes are ﬂatter, future
changes in the 3-year spreads are also small. Finally, when the credit-spread curve is steeply
positive, the modal class for changes in the 3-year spread is the largest positive change group.
These results suggest that the slope of the credit spread is informative on credit-spread changes,
with a steeper slope indicating a larger likelihood of a big change in spreads.
When we redo the analysis for the higher rated and lower rated banking ﬁrms separately, we
ﬁnd predictability to be high for the higher quality ﬁrms. When the slope is steeply negative,
46% of credit-spread changes are large negative changes. When the slope is steeply positive,
37% of the changes are large positive changes. In contrast, for the lower quality banks, when
the slope is steeply negative, 39% of changes are large positive changes, and when the slope is
positive, only 16% of changes are large positive changes.
The right panels of Table 5 repeat the analysis for future slope changes. There is strong
mean-reversion tendency in credit-spread slopes for the higher-rated banking ﬁrms, but not for
the lower-rated banking ﬁrms.
These descriptive statistics suggest that credit-spread slopes may be informative about future
credit spreads, and that the predictability of future spreads may be related to current credit
ratings.
5 Credit-Spread Slope as a Predictor of Forward Credit Spreads
Under the expectations hypothesis for credit spread curves, the n-period forward credit spread
is an unbiased estimator of the future one-period spot credit spread. In particular, let gn
t be the
forward credit spread for the quarterly period [t+n,t+n+1], viewed from quarter, t.T h es p o t
16credit spread for the current quarter is therefore g0
t. Clearly, the n-quarter credit spread yield









Following Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar and Wu (2001), we predict future forward credit spreads
using the regression:
gn−1
t+1 − st = αn + βn(gn
t − st)+ t+1 (10)
for maturities n ranging from one quarter to ten years in increments of quarters. If the credit-
spread slope can predict the n-quarter forward rates, then βn should be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0. For the expectations hypothesis to hold perfectly, with no time varying risk premia, βn
should be 1. We estimate equation (10) ﬁrst in a pooled setting over all banking ﬁrms, and then
separately for each ﬁrm in our sample.
The top panel of Figure 5 plots the beta coeﬃcients of the pooled regressions against matu-
rity. All the beta coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, indicating that the expectations
hypothesis for credit spreads does not hold perfectly. However, all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0, indicating that the credit-spread slope is informative of future forward credit
spreads. The beta coeﬃcients are an increasing function of maturity. The smallest deviations
from the expectations hypothesis come at maturities beyond 2 years. This plot is very similar
to the plot of slopes of riskless forward rate regressions obtained by Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar
and Wu.
Figure 5 Here
The bottom panel shows the beta values in a box-whiskers plot for individual banks across
the maturity spectrum. The overall pattern of the beta coeﬃcients plot remains unchanged.
Predictability is always there for all future forward credit spreads; and the greatest departures
from the expectations hypothesis occur at the short end of the maturity spectrum. Since all
future forward credit spreads depend on the slope of the current credit-spread curve, and since
credit spreads are averages of forward rates, future 3-year credit spreads will also depend on
credit-spread slopes.
There is signiﬁcant cross sectional variation over ﬁrms, especially for the shorter maturity
forward credit spreads. Indeed, the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the short end maturities are
much larger than the others. Based on our previous analyses, this could be attributed to ﬁrm
speciﬁc risk diﬀerences. To investigate this, we classify all banking ﬁrms into quartiles according
17to their ratings. The slopes of the forward-rate regression are computed for banking ﬁrms in
the lowest and highest ratings groups, and the results presented in Figure 6.
Figure 6 Here
The beta coeﬃcients for the shorter maturity forward credit spreads are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
for the two groups. This indicates that predictability of forward credit spreads in the near future
could well depend on ﬁrm ratings. To investigate this more rigorously, we consider the following
regression speciﬁcation:
gn−1
t+1 − st = αn + βn(gn
t − st)+γn(gn
t − st)R +  t+1. (11)
In this equation, the credit rating, R, interacts with the credit spread slope variable. Table 6
compares regression speciﬁcation (10) with the regression speciﬁcation equation (11).
Table 6 Here
Table 6 shows that the interaction eﬀect of ratings with slopes adds signiﬁcantly to the
predictability of forward credit spreads, especially for the shorter maturities. The adjusted R2
values for the model with the interaction term range from 10% at the short end, and increase
to around 90% at the longer end of 10 years. Thus, credit-spread slopes are very informative of
future credit spreads at the longer end of the maturity spectrum. At the shorter end, current
credit spread slopes are signiﬁcantly less informative of future credit spreads, and, moreover,
current ﬁrm risk characteristics (as encapsulated by credit ratings) also matter.
We now wish to establish whether credit-spread slopes have signiﬁcant explanatory power
over future credit spreads, over and above other information known to the market on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk and market-wide factors.
When considering ﬁrm risk variables and relating them to the current period credit-spread
slope, we need to be cognizant of when the ﬁrm information becomes known to the market. On
the last day of a quarter, the ﬁrm speciﬁc variables are not yet publicly released. The ﬁnal Call
Report (bank level) data are released to the public around 65 days after the end of the quarter,
and the ﬁnal Y9 (BHC level) data are released to the public around 80 days after the end of the
quarter. Thus, at the end of quarter t, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables pertaining to ﬁrm i in quarter,
t, denoted by the 5 vector Ft, are not yet publicly known. However, Ft−1, the vector of the 5
ﬁrm speciﬁc variables pertaining to the previous quarter are known precisely to the market at
18date t. We use the following regression speciﬁcation to predict future forward credit spreads:
gn−1
t+1 − st = αn + βn(gn
t − st)+γn(gn
t − st)R + βFFt + βMMt +  t+1
Ft = α0 + A1Ft−1 + A2Mt + et.
Here A1 and A2 are appropriately sized matrices of coeﬃcients and et is a vector of mean zero
errors. The last 3 columns of Table 7 examine whether the contribution of the slope variables
toward the predictability of forward credit spreads, in the presence of ﬁrm and market variables,
is signiﬁcant. As can be seen, for all maturities, the slope variables have predictive power over
forward credit spreads.
Table 7 Here
Table 7 also reports the sequential contribution of each block of variables in predicting the
next quarter’s forward credit spreads. We start with the credit-spread slope, then sequentially
add the slope-rating interaction variable, the 5-vector of ﬁrm variables, and ﬁnally, the 5-vector
of market variables. Consider the results of predicting next quarter’s forward rate for the 3
month period starting in 6 months. The slope accounts for 38.9% of the explainable sum of
squares. The slope-rating interaction term explains an additional 1.4%, the entire block of ﬁrm
variables explain an insigniﬁcant amount, while the entire block of market variables explain a
further 3.1%. The p-values report the signiﬁcance of the sequential contributions for each set of
explanatory variables for each maturity.
The slope-rating interaction variable is signiﬁcant in predicting future forward credit spreads
up to 2 years, but not thereafter. In the presence of the slope and ratings-slope interaction
variables, ﬁrm variables do not add to the explanatory power. This is true for all maturities.
However, economy-wide eﬀects add to the explanatory power in predicting future credit spreads,
especially for short maturities.
To examine which market variables are important in predicting forward credit spreads over
and above the slope variables, we force the slope and the slope-rating interaction variable into
our regression model, and allow market variables to enter into the model in a stepwise regression
procedure. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are not included since as a block they did not add signiﬁ-
cantly to predictive capability. Table 8 reports the regression coeﬃcients and the corresponding
p-values for several maturities.
Table 8 Here
19At the short end of the maturity spectrum, future forward credit spreads are determined, to
some extent, by the returns and volatility of the market (VIX and S&P). Beyond one year, these
variables have no signiﬁcant predictive power, and the only market factor that appears to be
signiﬁcant is the 5-year Treasury yield. Beyond 3-years, no single market factor has signiﬁcant
inﬂuence over future credit spreads. These results indicate that for the short maturity forward
credit spreads, the time varying risk premia may be linked to stock market factors.
6 Credit-Spread Slope as a Predictor of Bank Risk
The fact that credit-spread slopes can predict future forward credit spreads does not, however,
imply that credit-spread slopes contain information about future ﬁrm risk changes over and
above other information that is available to the market, such as credit ratings, ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
information and market-wide information.
We examine the information content of current credit-spread slopes about future ﬁrm risk
in two ways. First, we conduct a canonical correlation analysis between the next quarter’s ﬁrm
risk variables and our two slope variables after controlling for ﬁrm and market variables. The
purpose of this exercise is to examine whether there is any linear relationship between current
period slope variables and next period’s ﬁrm risk variables. If there is no signiﬁcant canonical
correlation, then slope variables cannot provide any additional information on future ﬁrm risk,
over and above other information already known to the market. If there is signiﬁcant correlation,
then slope variables may be useful for predicting the direction of ﬁrm risk variables.
In particular, let X1 = F 
t+1 be a 5-vector of banking-ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk variables and let
Xn
2 =( F 
t, M 
t, gn
t - st,( gn
t - st)R)  be a 13-vector of explanatory variables. Let u = α X1
and vn = γ 
nXn
2 be two arbitrary linear functions of the dependent and independent variables.
The left panel reports the canonical correlations and redundancy between u and vn,a sw e l la s
the Bartlett test statistics for a range of maturity values, n. The right panel reports the same
statistics when the eﬀects of Ft and Mt have been partialled out. The results are shown in
Table 9.
Table 9 Here
Across the entire maturity spectrum, the canonical correlation between the best linear com-
binations of future ﬁrm risk variables and the predictor variables is very high at around 0.97.
The Bartlett tests, shown by the chi squared statistics, and p-values indicate that all canonical
variates have signiﬁcant correlation. However, these tests, by themselves, do not imply that risk
20variables can be signiﬁcantly predicted by current period slope, ﬁrm and market variables. To
establish this, additional statistics need to be computed to assess the amount of the dependent
variable variation that is shared or accounted for by the set of independent variables. The re-
dundancy index reports the proportion of variance of the criterion variables explained by the
canonical variable. Table 9 shows that the redundancy index for the ﬁrst set is around 0.378.
Roughly, this means that about 38% of the variance of the dependent variables is explained by
the ﬁrst canonical variate of the predictor set. The redundancy measure gives a more realistic
picture of the amount of shared variance between the dependent and predictor variables than
does the correlation measure. The second canonical redundancy measure is about 29%, and then
there is a big drop oﬀ. The ﬁrst two canonical covariates, thus, explain a signiﬁcant fraction of
the variability of the dependent variables.
The right panel shows the predictive power of only the two slope-related variables. Once all
the other market and ﬁrm speciﬁc variables have been partialled out, the best linear combinations
of the slope variables do not correlate highly with future bank-risk variables. Only the 3-
month forward credit spreads has some predictive ability over future ﬁrm risks. The overall
results indicate that the marginal information content of credit-spread slopes on future ﬁrm risk
variables is not signiﬁcant.
As a second conﬁrmatory test, we regress each of the future (next quarter) ﬁrm-risk variables
on current ﬁrm, market, and slope variables, and we examine whether, in the presence of Ft
and Mt, the block of slope variables has any explanatory power, using the following regression
speciﬁcation:
Fs
t+1 = β0 + β1Ft + β2Mt + β3(gn
t − st)+β4(gn
t − st)Rt +  t+1 (12)
Ft = α0 + A1Ft−1 + A2Mt + et,
where Fs
t+1 represents the ﬁrm speciﬁc variable next quarter. The percentage contribution of
the slope variables toward the explainable sum of squares is shown in Table 10 for each of our
5 explanatory ﬁrm risk variables.
Table 10 Here
The results show that the short maturity forward credit-spread slopes can predict the future
loan to assets ratio, non-performing assets and net charge-oﬀs. However, while statistically
signiﬁcant, the overall marginal contribution of the slope variables to the explanatory sums
of squares is small: less than 3.5% in all cases. In general, the longer-maturity forward slopes
cannot predict the next quarter’s bank risk variables. Thus, we ﬁnd that while the current period
21credit-spread slope variables can predict future credit spreads, their predictive power over future
ﬁrm risk variables is limited, especially when we consider the longer maturity forward slopes.
To examine whether this result is speciﬁc to banking ﬁrms, which are highly regulated, or
whether it is a more general result across other industries, we repeat the analysis for our sample
of non-banking ﬁrms.
Table 11 Here
Table 11 shows that once the ﬁrm-risk and market variables have been factored out, the best
linear combination of the slope variables does not correlate at all with future ﬁrm-risk variables,
across all maturities. This indicates that the marginal information content of credit-spread
slopes on future ﬁrm risk variables is insigniﬁcant for non-banking ﬁrms. Our results lead us to
conclude that credit-spread slopes engendered by mandatory SND may not provide signiﬁcant
information on future bank risk changes, over and above the information the market already
possesses.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine three issues. First, we examine the features of credit-spread slopes
for banking ﬁrms. Second, we evaluate whether credit-spread slopes can predict credit spreads.
Third, we examine whether the credit-spread slope can predict ﬁrm risk variables, above and
beyond information currently available to the market. To address these issues, we carefully
extract a time series of credit-spread curves for a set of banking and non-banking ﬁrms, and
then analyze the resulting slopes of these curves.
We ﬁnd that, on average, credit-spread slopes are negative for banking ﬁrms. Credit-spread
slopes of the lower credit-rated banking ﬁrms are more negative than those of the higher-rated
banking ﬁrms. Credit spreads across maturities are also signiﬁcantly higher for the lower rated
banking ﬁrms. When we examine credit-spread slope changes from quarter to quarter, we ﬁnd
strong evidence of mean-reversion tendency in credit-spread slopes. If the credit-spread slope of
a banking ﬁrm is steeply negative, it is more likely to be less steeply negative in the next quarter.
However, this result is considerably weaker for the lower-rated banking ﬁrms. This leads us to
suspect that the predictability of future ﬁrm risk, as measured by future credit spreads, may
depend on current ﬁrm risk, as measured by a ﬁrm’s credit rating.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that the current credit-spread slopes can predict future forward
credit spreads. Predictability is always present across all maturities. The greatest departures
22from the expectations hypothesis occur for the short maturity forward credit spreads. At the
shorter end of the maturity spectrum, credit ratings and general stock market conditions aﬀect
future credit spreads in systematic ways.
The fact that slopes are important for predicting future credit spread levels does not imply
that slopes can predict future bank risk variables. Indeed, we ﬁnd that current period credit-
spread slopes, in general, do not provide economically signiﬁcant information about future ﬁrm
risk ratios over and above the other information the market already possesses. This result is not
unique to the banking sector, and also holds for our control sample of non-banking ﬁrms. Thus,
we ﬁnd little evidence that credit-spread curves resulting from any mandatory SND requirement
contain additional information about future ﬁrm risk, over and above other information the
market would already possess even in the absence of any subordinated debt.
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of banking firm subordinated debt trades 
 
Our initial sample contains all banking firm debt transactions data found in the National Association of Security 
Commissioners (NAIC) database for the period 1994 through 1999. The first screen eliminates all debt other than 
fixed-rate US dollar denominated debt that is non-callable, non-puttable, non-convertible, not part of an unit (e.g. sold 
with warrants) and has no sinking fund. We exclude debt with asset-backed and credit enhancement features. We 
eliminate non-investment grade debt. We use only trade prices. Further, we eliminate all data that have inconsistent or 
suspicious issue/dates/maturity/coupon etc., or otherwise does not look reasonable. The second screen eliminates all 
those firm-quarter combinations for which we had less than 7 trades for the quarter, to ensure that we could obtain 
reliable estimates for the credit spread curve for a firm at the end of each quarter. The third and final screen removes 
transactions from firms for which bank specific risk measures are not found in the Y-9 and call reports for all the 24 
quarters of our data set, one quarter before our data begins and one quarter after it ends. 
 
Initial sample  Sample after first screen  Sample after second 
screen 
Sample after third screen 
 
Quarter 
# Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms 
Q11994  207 29 185 28  51  4  0  0 
Q21994  257 28 198 28  61  6  35  3 
Q31994  194 28 158 28  88  10  41  5 
Q41994  263 30 224 29 141 12 100  8 
Q11995  560 43 400 42 254 14 220 10 
Q21995  599 46 466 45 317 20 257 12 
Q31995  624 43 496 42 345 23 289 17 
Q41995  701 52 540 50 387 30 313 18 
Q11996  767 58 589 56 408 33 300 22 
Q21996  516 50 485 50 287 36 243 25 
Q31996  613 52 456 50 317 38 278 27 
Q41996  887 57 652 56 436 41 365 28 
Q11997  873 51 609 50 429 44 296 29 
Q21997  719 59 576 58 382 47 285 27 
Q31997  753 57 587 55 401 48 276 29 
Q41997  737 50 588 49 368 49 263 30 
Q11998  1220  76 892 74 517 52 359 30 
Q21998  1186  76 851 74 538 55 282 30 
Q31998  782 67 654 66 456 59 223 31 
Q41998  1095  74 888 73 554 63 382 33 
Q11999  1277 92 1082 91  619  67  408  36 
Q21999  1448 97 1021 93  607  70  441  40 
Q31999  1069  89 941 88 541 73 422 42 
Q41999  1429 98 1122 98  663  82  512  41 
Total  18776 185 14660 144  9167  81  6590  50   27
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of non-bank subordinated debt trades 
 
Our initial sample contains all non-bank debt transactions data found in the National Association of Security 
Commissioners (NAIC) database for the period 1994 through 1999. The first screen eliminates all debt other than 
fixed-rate US dollar denominated debt that is non-callable, non-puttable, non-convertible, not part of an unit (e.g. sold 
with warrants) and has no sinking fund. We exclude debt with asset-backed and credit enhancement features. We 
eliminate non-investment grade debt. We use only trade prices. Further, we eliminate all data that have inconsistent or 
suspicious issue/dates/maturity/coupon etc., or otherwise does not look reasonable. The second screen eliminates all 
those firm-quarter combinations for which we had less than 7 trades for the quarter, to ensure that we could obtain 
reliable estimates for the credit spread curve for a firm at the end of each quarter. The third and final screen removes 
transactions from firms for which bank specific risk measures are not found in the Compustat Quarterly database for all 
the 24 quarters of our data set, one quarter before our data begins and one quarter after it ends. 
 
Initial sample  Sample after first screen  Sample after second 
screen 
Sample after third screen 
 
Quarter 
# Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms  # Trades  # Firms 
Q11994  2092  323  132  41  0 0 0 0 
Q21994 1881  315  108  39  27  4  0  0 
Q31994  1734  314  119  41  40 6 16 3 
Q41994  1968  332  124  47  40 9 10 5 
Q11995  4316  445  148  51 69 12 38  7 
Q21995  4935  471  283 72 173 18 107 10 
Q31995  4850  463  304 56 252 23 152 13 
Q41995  6608  527  368 78 260 25 149 15 
Q11996  7723  559  153 51 117 28  68  16 
Q21996  5967  542  331 81 246 31 156 20 
Q31996  5165  553  268 88 188 32 130 22 
Q41996  7039  617  316 91 225 34 151 23 
Q11997  6739  661  124 40 102 24  65  25 
Q21997  6520  670  293 86 224 37 142 23 
Q31997  7316  675  325 78 268 41 162 24 
Q41997  8390  745  323 89 248 42 144 27 
Q11998 16368  1344  1413  144  454  63  193  26 
Q21998  15162  1383  1519  174 694 107 268  39 
Q31998  14024  1286  1257  170 785 137 379  65 
Q41998  16627  1437  1359  182 852 154 506  82 
Q11999  25833  1772  4319 209 2707 168 1499  94 
Q21999  25044  1856  4936 222 2705 185 1520  96 
Q31999  21283  1713  3614 226 2459 202 1464 108 
Q41999  23162  1896  4342 230 3345 220 2254 118 
Total  240876  3265  26608 245 16480 210  9703  133 
    28
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of our final sample of subordinated debt issues made by  
banking and non-banking firms 
 
Panels A and B show the frequency distribution of issues falling under different maturity, coupon, and rating categories 
for 50 banking firms (535 issues) and 133 non-banking firms (2335 issues) that make up our final sample of trades. The 
credit ratings come from Duff and Phelp, Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. Whenever an issue is rated is more 
than one rating agency, the average rating is reported. 












Credit Banks  Non-Banks
AA and above 8 11
A6 2 3 1
BBB 14 14
BB and below 3 3
Rating not found 13 41  29
Table 4 
Banking Firms: Credit Spread Levels and Slopes  
 
The first 2 panels report the average credit-spread levels and credit-spread slopes for our final sample of 482 credit 
spread curves for the period 1994 - 1999, for all banking firms, and by Credit Rating, Firm Type (bank or BHC), Size, 
and Leverage. The high Credit Rating category comprises banking firms with credit ratings of A- and above, and the 
low Credit Rating category the remaining banking firms. High and low categories based on size (total assets), and 
leverage are defined in terms of being above and below the sample median respectively. The means are reported in 
basis points, with the standard errors in parenthesis. In the third panel, all current period banking-firm credit-spread 
slopes are categorized into 4 groups such that Groups 1 and 2 are negative and Groups 3 and 4 are positive, with Group 
1 being the most negative and Group 4 being the most positive. For each category of credit rating, type, size and 
leverage, the proportion of slopes in each group is reported. For example, for low rated banking firms, 39.5% of the 

















Maturity All Low High BHC Bank Small Large Low High
(Years)
3 133.7 176.2 157.0 127.8 145.5 135.7 131.6 130.5 136.8
(3.0)           (12.02)       (22.20)       (2.99)         (6.80)         (5.20)         (3.16)         (5.15)         (3.21)        
5 124.4 156.9 113.9 120.3 132.6 125.9 122.9 122.6 126.1
Levels (2.9)           (12.01)       (19.11)       (2.82)         (6.69)         (5.09)         (2.89)         (5.04)         (2.96)        
7 119.6 146.7 109.3 116.5 125.9 120.8 118.6 118.6 120.7
(3.0)           (12.24)       (19.23)       (2.90)         (6.76)         (5.21)         (2.89)         (5.09)         (3.07)        
10 115.8 138.1 105.5 113.5 120.4 116.6 115.0 115.4 116.2
(3.1)           (12.52)       (20.35)       (3.06)         (6.90)         (5.39)         (2.98)         (5.19)         (3.29)        
Spread
(Years)
3 - 1 -24.2 -45.3 -25.3 -20.4 -31.9 -24.8 -23.7 -21.8 -26.6
(2.2) (5.75) (2.40) (2.52) (3.98) (3.37) (2.71) (2.96) (3.14)
Slopes 7- 3 -14.0 -29.4 -14.1 -11.2 -19.6 -15.0 -13.0 -11.9 -16.1
(1.5)           (4.26)         (1.51)         (1.73)         (2.60)         (2.35)         (1.71)         (1.92)         (2.18)        
10 - 5 -8.6 -18.8 -8.4 -6.8 -12.3 -9.3 -7.9 -7.2 -10.0
(1.0)           (2.96)         (1.03)         (1.18)         (1.77)         (1.56)         (1.22)         (1.27)         (1.52)        
10 - 3 -17.9 -38.0 -14.1 -14.2 -25.2 -19.2 -16.6 -15.1 -20.6
(1.9)           (5.63)         (1.51)         (2.28)         (3.40)         (3.07)         (2.28)         (2.50)         (2.88)        
10-3
Slope 1 23.9% 39.5% 23.7% 21.1% 29.4% 24.6% 23.1% 20.3% 27.4%
Group
2 28.6% 22.2% 27.5% 29.8% 26.3% 25.8% 31.4% 28.2% 29.0%
3 23.9% 21.0% 27.5% 24.8% 21.9% 22.9% 24.8% 27.8% 19.9%
4 23.6% 17.3% 21.3% 24.2% 22.5% 26.7% 20.7% 23.7% 23.7%
81 338 322 160 241 241 241 241
Credit Ratings Firm Type Size Leverage  30
 Table 5 
 Future Changes in Credit-Spreads and Credit-Spread Slopes  
 
The left panel shows how future changes in credit spreads depend on the current credit-spread slope for all banking 
firms. All the credit-spread slope changes from the current quarter to the next quarter are categorized into 4 groups such 
that Groups 1 and 2 are negative and Groups 3 and 4 are positive, with Group 1 being the most negative and Group 4 
being the most positive.  23.4%, 23.8%, 25.7% and 27.1% of all credit-spread curves fall into the credit-spread slope 
change groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. As an example, consider banking firms that have the most negative credit-
spread slopes: for such firms, 43.81% of the changes in the 3-year credit spreads from the current quarter to the next 
quarter fall in the most negative spread change group. The same analysis is repeated separately for high and low credit 
rated firms. The right panel shows how future changes in credit-spread slope depend on the current level of the slope 
for all banking firms. All the 3-year credit-spread changes from the current quarter to the next quarter are categorized 
into 4 groups such that Groups 1 and 2 are negative and Groups 3 and 4 are positive, with Group 1 being the most 
negative and Group 4 being the most positive. As an example, consider firms in the lowest group: 32.38% of these 
firms have very large negative changes in slopes, while 53.33% have very large positive changes in the slopes. The 
same analysis is repeated separately for high and low credit rated firms. The modal group(s) for future changes is (are) 













1 43.81 15.24 17.14 23.81 32.38 5.71 8.57 53.33
2 16.39 31.97 26.23 25.41 24.59 21.31 29.51 24.59
3 18.63 24.51 33.33 23.53 12.75 29.41 43.14 14.71
4 22.33 31.07 19.42 27.18 23.30 39.81 21.36 15.53
Slope 
Group 1234 1234
1 38.71 9.68 12.90 38.71 45.16 3.23 3.23 48.39
2 23.53 23.53 29.41 23.53 35.29 11.76 47.06 5.88
3 6.25 31.25 25.00 37.50 12.50 50.00 37.50 0.00
4 41.67 25.00 16.67 16.67 8.33 50.00 33.33 8.33
Slope 
Group 1234 1234
1 46.48 16.90 18.31 18.31 28.17 7.04 9.86 54.93
2 15.66 22.89 30.12 31.33 25.30 16.87 24.10 33.73
3 21.69 22.89 33.73 21.69 13.25 25.30 44.58 16.87
4 22.39 22.39 17.91 37.31 29.85 38.81 17.91 13.43
Future Change in Spread Group Future Change in Slope Group
Lower Credit Rated 
Higher Credit Rated   31
Table 6 
Future Changes in Forward Credit Spreads: Predictive Power of Slope and Ratings 
 
The table shows the results of two different models for predicting n-period ahead forward credit spreads for the next 
quarter, based on the slope of the forward credit-spread curve and the interaction term of slope with firm ratings.  The 2 
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t g is the n-1 period ahead forward credit spread in the next quarter 
n
t g is the n-period ahead forward credit spread in the current quarter, and R is the current period firm rating. The 
coefficients for the credit-spread slope, for the first regression equation, and the coefficients for the credit-spread slope 
and the interaction term are reported below, along with their p-values. The analysis is restricted to all firms-quarters 































Maturity Beta p  Beta p R   
Coefficient Value Coefficient Value Squared 
3 months slope  0.307 0.000 -0.455 0.136 0.109
interaction 0.773 0.012
6 months slope  0.624 0.000 -0.101 0.682 0.403
interaction 0.735 0.003
9 months  slope  0.800 0.000 0.221 0.240 0.649
interaction 0.587 0.002
1 year slope  0.885 0.000 0.442 0.002 0.784
interaction 0.449 0.002
2 years slope  0.961 0.000 0.783 0.000 0.924
interaction 0.180 0.028
3 years slope  0.964 0.000 0.852 0.000 0.931
interaction 0.114 0.129
10 years slope  0.949 0.000 0.843 0.000 0.902
interaction 0.108 0.163
Slope Only  Full Model  32
Table 7 
Determinants of Future Changes in Forward Credit Spreads 
 
This table shows the explanatory power of the slope of the forward credit-spread curve, the interaction term of credit 
spread slope and firm rating, firm variables, and market variables in predicting future changes in the n-period ahead 
forward credit spreads. Since information on firm variables is released after the end of the quarter, they are 
instrumented using firm and market information that are known at the end of the quarter. The regression specification 
used is: 
+ − + − + = − −
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t g is the n-1 period ahead forward credit spread in the next quarter,  n
t g is 
the n-period ahead forward credit spread in the current quarter, R is the current period firm rating, Ft is the 5-vector of 
firm risk variables, Mt is the 5-vector of market variables, and Ft-1 is the 5-vector of firm specific variables pertaining to 
the previous quarter and precisely known at time t. α0  is a vector of size 5, A1 and A2 are appropriately sized matrices 
and  et  is a vector of residuals with mean 0.  
 
The left panel of the table reports the sequential contribution to the explanatory power by each additional block of 
explanatory variables (the R squared change, F-statistic and the p-values). The right panel shows the contribution of the 
slope and the interaction of slope with rating variable to the explanatory power of the full model (with the firm and 
market variables included). The analysis is restricted to all firms-quarters with credit rating information. 
Maturity  Block of Variables
(of 3-month Forward)
R Square  F p R Square  F p
Change Value Value Change Value Value
3 months Slope 0.095 40.307 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.015 6.418 0.012
Firm variables 0.010 0.841 0.521
Market Variables 0.048 4.330 0.001
0.116 26.225 0.000
6 months  Slope 0.389 245.930 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.014 8.850 0.003
Firm variables 0.003 0.390 0.856
Market Variables 0.031 4.062 0.001
0.389 129.356 0.000
9 months  Slope 0.640 685.936 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.009 9.827 0.002
Firm variables 0.001 0.163 0.976
Market Variables 0.016 3.695 0.003
0.619 347.500 0.000
1 year  Slope 0.783 1393.632 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.005 9.749 0.002
Firm variables 0.000 0.096 0.993
Market Variables 0.009 3.355 0.006
0.752 697.432 0.000
2 years  Slope 0.923 4626.110 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.001 4.846 0.028
Firm variables 0.000 0.496 0.779
Market Variables 0.002 2.525 0.029
0.888 2278.325 0.000
3 years Slope 0.930 5105.883 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.000 2.317 0.129
Firm variables 0.001 0.564 0.728
Market Variables 0.002 2.188 0.055
0.897 2495.237 0.000
10 years Slope 0.901 3505.451 0.000
Slope/Ratings 0.001 1.955 0.163
Firm variables 0.000 0.156 0.978
Market Variables 0.002 1.791 0.114
0.864 1683.736 0.000
Sequential Contribution Contribution of Slope 
Variables  in Full model  of each Block   33
Table 8 
Future Changes in Forward Credit Spreads: Importance of Market Variables 
 
This table reports the regression coefficients and the corresponding p-values (in parenthesis) when the n-period ahead 
forward credit spreads for the next quarter is regressed on the slope of the forward credit-spread curve, interaction term 
of slope with ratings and the 5-vector of market variables, using the step-wise regression methodology on the following 
regression specification: 
+ − + − + = − −
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t g is the n-1 period ahead forward credit spread in the next quarter,  n
t g is 
the n-period ahead forward credit spread in the current quarter, R is the current period firm rating, and Mt is the 5-





Maturity Slope Interaction VIX S&P 5 Year Adjusted 
(years) Treasury R Square 
0.25 -0.502 0.821 0.124 -0.100 - 0.136
(0.095) (0.006) (0.012) (0.043)
0.50 -0.148 0.781 0.106 -0.080 - 0.423
(0.541) (0.001) (0.009) (0.048)
0.75 0.181 0.629 0.098 - - 0.658
(0.328) (0.001) (0.001)
1.00 0.413 0.480 0.074 - - 0.794
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
1.25 0.614 0.317 - - -0.058 0.863
(0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
1.50 0.937 0.010 - - -0.050 0.897
(0.000) (0.816) (0.002)
1.75 0.762 0.198 - - -0.042 0.917
(0.000) (0.023) (0.005)
2.00 0.802 0.162 - - -0.037 0.925
(0.000) (0.046) (0.008)
2.25 0.828 0.138 - - -0.034 0.930
(0.000) (0.076) (0.013)
2.50 0.846 0.121 - - -0.031 0.931
(0.000) (0.112) (0.022)
2.75 -0.029 0.858 - - -0.029 0.931
(0.033) (0.000) (0.033)
3.00 -0.027 0.866 - - -0.027 0.931
(0.046) (0.000) (0.046)
4.00 0.867 0.097 - - - 0.927
(0.000) (0.190)
10.00 0.846 0.106 - - - 0.901
(0.000) (0.169)
Slope Variables  Market Variables  34
Table 9 
Determinants of Future Bank Risk Variables: Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
Let X1 = Ft+1’ be a 5-vector of banking-firm-specific risk variables and let X2
n
 = (Ft’, Mt’, ) ( t
n
t s g − ,  ) ( t
n
t s g − R)’ be a 
13-vector of independent variables. Let u = α’X1 and vn = γn’X2
n be two arbitrary linear functions of the dependent and 
independent variables. The left panel reports the canonical correlations between u and vn, as well as the canonical 
redundancies and Bartlett test statistics for a range of maturity values, n. The right panel reports the same statistics 
when the effects of Ft and Mt have been partialled out, and X2
n
 is now ( ) ( t
n
t s g − ,  ) ( t
n
t s g − R)’. The symbol * denotes 







Full Model Slope & Interaction variable given everything else
Canonical Canonical Canonical Chi Squared Canonical Canonical Canonical Chi Squared
Maturity Factors Correlation Redundancy Value Factors Correlation Redundancy Value
1 0.971 0.378 2408.7*
2 0.908 0.290 1348.5* 1 0.206 0.007 16.188
3 months 3 0.810 0.036 702.5* 2 0.032 0.000 0.366
4 0.671 0.058 306.2*
5 0.451 0.013 84.2*
1 0.971 0.378 2400.5*
2 0.907 0.289 1340.1* 1 0.173 0.005 11.513
6 months 3 0.810 0.036 697.3* 2 0.032 0.000 0.378
4 0.670 0.057 300.9*
5 0.440 0.013 79.7*
1 0.971 0.378 2394.8*
2 0.907 0.289 1334.3* 1 0.147 0.004 8.336
9 months 3 0.810 0.036 693.9* 2 0.032 0.000 0.369
4 0.670 0.057 297.4*
5 0.432 0.012 76.5*
1 0.971 0.378 2390.8*
2 0.906 0.288 1330.2* 1 0.126 0.004 6.209
1 year 3 0.810 0.036 691.7* 2 0.030 0.000 0.340
4 0.670 0.056 295.2*
5 0.426 0.012 74.3*
1 0.971 0.377 2383.4*
2 0.905 0.288 1323.3* 1 0.087 0.002 2.959
2 years 3 0.810 0.036 689.2* 2 0.022 0.000 0.171
4 0.671 0.056 292.6*
5 0.416 0.012 70.6*
1 0.971 0.376 2381.4*
2 0.904 0.288 1321.6* 1 0.083 0.002 2.673
3 years 3 0.810 0.036 689.7* 2 0.018 0.000 0.118
4 0.672 0.057 293.1*
5 0.415 0.012 70.0*
1 0.971 0.376 2380.8*
2 0.903 0.288 1321.8* 1 0.109 0.002 4.528
10 years 3 0.810 0.036 693.5* 2 0.020 0.000 0.141
4 0.674 0.058 296.7*
5 0.420 0.012 71.9*  35
Table 10 
Credit Spread Slope as a Determinant of Future Bank Risk Variables 
 
The table shows the marginal contribution of the slope and the interaction term of the slope with credit-ratings,to the 
total explainable sums of squares  when the future (next quarter) banking firm risk ratios are individually regressed on 
the slope of the forward credit-spread curve, interaction term of slope with ratings, the 5-vector of bank risk variables, 
and the 5-vector of market variables, using the following regression equation: 
s




t n n ) ( ) ( − + − + γ β α + βF Ft + βM Mt + εt+1 
            Ft     =  α0 + A1 Ft-1 + A2Mt + εt 
 
where t s  is the current period spot credit spread,  n
t g is the n-period ahead forward credit spread in the current quarter, 
R is the current period firm rating, Ft is the 5-vector of firm risk variables, Mt is the 5-vector of market variables, and 
Ft-1  is the 5-vector of firm specific variables pertaining to the previous quarter and precisely known at time t. The 
dependent variable is the specific firm risk variable at time t+1, s
t F 1 + . The p-value for the significance of  the slope and 
interaction terms is shown in parentheses. For example, in the first regression, where ROA is the firm specific 
dependent variable, and the 3 month slope variables are used, the slope and its interaction effects account for 0.34% of 
the explained sums of squares and the partial F test indicates that this is not significant. (The p-value is 0.43) 
The numbers that are shown in bold text are significant at the 5% level. The analysis is restricted to all firms-quarters 




Maturity ROA Loan to Net Charge Leverage
Total Assets Assets offs
3 months 0.34% 3.22% 1.04% 3.48% 0.12%
(0.43) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
6 months  0.17% 0.00% 0.78% 2.81% 0.12%
(0.67) (0.27) (0.01) (0.00) (0.22)
9 months 1.68% 0.00% 0.65% 2.26% 0.12%
(0.70) (0.51) (0.03) (0.00) (0.23)
1 year 0.17% 0.00% 0.52% 1.70% 0.12%
(0.60) (0.70) (0.06) (0.00) (0.25)
2 years 0.68% 0.00% 0.26% 0.72% 0.12%
(0.19) (0.83) (0.26) (0.04) (0.35)
3 years 1.01% 0.00% 0.13% 0.29% 0.12%
(0.07) (0.97) (0.47) (0.24) (0.46)
10 years 1.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(0.70) (0.88) (0.84) (0.97) (0.77)
0.69 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.92
Marginal Percentage Contribution  by Slope Variables to Explainable SSQ 
Non Performing 
R Square values with just 
firm and market variables   36
Table 11 
Determinants of Future Non-Bank Risk Variables: Canonical Correlation Analysis 
 
Let X1 = Ft+1’ be a 5-vector of banking-firm-specific risk variables and let X2
n
 = (Ft’, Mt’, ) ( t
n
t s g − ,  ) ( t
n
t s g − R)’ be a 
13-vector of independent variables. Let u = α’X1 and vn = γn’X2
n be two arbitrary linear functions of the dependent and 
independent variables. The left panel reports the canonical correlations between u and vn, as well as the canonical 
redundancies and Bartlett test statistics for a range of maturity values, n. The right panel reports the same statistics 
when the effects of Ft and Mt have been partialled out, and X2
n
 is now ( ) ( t
n
t s g − ,  ) ( t
n
t s g − R)’. The symbol * denotes 





Full Model Slope & Interaction variable given everything else
Canonical Canonical Canonical Chi Squared Canonical Canonical Canonical Chi Squared
Maturity Factors Correlation Redundancy Value Factors Correlation Redundancy Value
1 0.909 0.242 2330.16*
2 0.838 0.102 1239.13* 1 0.064 0.000 2.851
3 months 3 0.620 0.079 482.09* 2 0.022 0.000 0.302
4 0.475 0.034 178.97*
5 0.176 0.006 19.7*
1 0.909 0.242 2329.96*
2 0.838 0.102 1239.218* 1 0.065 0.000 2.863
6 months 3 0.620 0.079 482.17* 2 0.018 0.000 0.210
4 0.475 0.034 179.03*
5 0.176 0.006 19.7*
1 0.909 0.242 2329.92*
2 0.838 0.102 1239.36* 1 0.067 0.001 2.938
9 months 3 0.620 0.079 482.32* 2 0.016 0.000 0.163
4 0.475 0.034 179.11*
5 0.176 0.006 19.72*
1 0.909 0.242 2329.95*
2 0.838 0.102 1239.54* 1 0.068 0.001 3.040
1 year 3 0.620 0.079 482.5* 2 0.015 0.000 0.137
4 0.475 0.034 179.2*
5 0.176 0.006 19.74*
1 0.909 0.242 2330.25*
2 0.838 0.102 1240.14* 1 0.073 0.005 3.424
2 years 3 0.621 0.079 483.1* 2 0.014 0.000 0.123
4 0.475 0.034 179.5*
5 0.177 0.006 19.83*
1 0.909 0.242 2330.41*
2 0.838 0.102 1240.42* 1 0.075 0.005 3.616
3 years 3 0.621 0.079 483.38* 2 0.016 0.000 0.165
4 0.475 0.034 179.65*
5 0.177 0.007 19.92*
1 0.909 0.242 2329.44*
2 0.838 0.102 1239.58* 1 0.065 0.001 3.069
10 years 3 0.620 0.079 482.55* 2 0.027 0.000 0.443
4 0.475 0.034 179.4*
5 0.178 0.007 20.09*  37
Figure 1 
Banking Firm Subordinated Debt Maturities by Credit Rating 
 
Banking firm credit ratings come from one or more of the following rating agencies: Duff and Phelp, Standard and 
Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. We translate the letter ratings of all agencies for each issue into numeric scores, with 1 
representing the lowest rating and 15 the highest rating. We then take the average values of all the agency ratings 
associated with an issue to arrive at a single numerical rating score for an issue. Using the Standard & Poor notation, 
BBB+, A- and A correspond to numerical scores of 9, 10 and 11 respectively.  Our final sample comprises 535 
outstanding issues made by 50 banking firms, of which we have credit ratings for 518 issues. This figure shows the 
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Figure 2 
Riskless Interest Rates: Pricing Errors  
 
This figure shows histograms of the basis point errors, by maturity, when our two factor double mean reverting model 
is used to estimate the riskless yield curves. Each histogram consists of 364 points corresponding to consecutive weekly 
observations from January 1993 to December 2000. The parameter values are estimated using a Kalman filter. The 
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Figure 3 
Pricing Errors for Subordinated Debt for Banks and Non-Banks 
 
The left panel shows the percentage errors when our 3 factor model is used to price subordinated debt issued by 
banking firms for different maturity buckets – defined as (0,2] years, (2, 5] years, (5, 10] years,  (10, 20] years and > 20 
years. The right panel shows the percentage errors when our model is used to price subordinated debt issued by non-
banking firms for the same maturity buckets.  
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Figure 4 
 Credit Spread Slopes and Future Changes 
The top figure shows a scatter diagram of the 10-year minus 3-year credit-spread slopes over each quarter for all 
banking firms. The second figure shows the changes in 10-year minus 3-year credit-spread slopes from one quarter to 
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Predictability of Future Changes in Forward rates 
 
The figure plots the beta coefficients that predict the next quarter’s n-period forward rate from its current level and 
from the current credit-spread slope, using the following regression specification: 
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where n ranges from 1quarter to 20 quarters. The 95% confidence interval for the beta values is indicated by the dashed 
lines. The second figure shows a box and whiskers plot of the beta values when the regressions are performed 


















































































Predictability of Future Changes in Forward rates:  Higher and Lower Rated Banking Firms 
 
The figure plots the beta coefficients that predict the next quarter’s n-period forward rate from its current level and 
from the current credit-spread slope. We separated firms into high and low quality class. The high quality class 
comprised of all firms in the top rating quartile; the low quality firms were all those firms in the lowest quartile. The 
regression equation used is: 
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where k indicates which of the two classes of firms, and n ranges from 1quarter to 12 quarters. The figure shows the 
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